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 Abstract 
Full-scale crash tests were conducted on three Cessna 172 aircraft at NASA Langley Research 
Center’s Landing and Impact Research facility during the summer of 2015.  The purpose of the 
three tests was to evaluate the performance of commercially available Emergency Locator 
Transmitter (ELT) systems and support development of enhanced installation guidance.  ELTs are 
used to provide location information to Search and Rescue (SAR) organizations in the event of an 
aviation distress situation, such as a crash.   
The crash tests simulated three differing severe but survivable crash conditions, in which it is 
expected that the onboard occupants have a reasonable chance of surviving the accident and would 
require assistance from SAR personnel.  The first simulated an emergency landing onto a rigid 
surface, while the second and third simulated controlled flight into terrain.  Multiple ELT systems 
were installed on each airplane according to federal regulations.  The majority of the ELT systems 
performed nominally.  In the systems which did not activate, post-test disassembly and inspection 
offered guidance for non-activation cause in some cases, while in others, no specific cause could 
be found.  In a subset of installations purposely disregarding best practice guidelines, failure of the 
ELT-to-antenna cabling connections were found.   
Recommendations for enhanced installation guidance of ELT systems will be made to the Radio 
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 229 for consideration for 
adoption in a future release of ELT minimum operational performance specifications. These 
recommendations will be based on the data gathered during this test series as well as a larger series 
of crash simulations using computer models that will be calibrated based on these data. 
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Introduction 
The NASA Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Office, located at Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC), initiated a study in 2013 with the goals of collecting data for the use in updating 
performance standards for the next generation of Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) [1]. After 
a series of component and subsystem-level environmental tests in 2014, a series of three 
survivable, full-scale aircraft crash tests were performed at the Landing and Impact Research 
Facility (LandIR), located at NASA’s Langley Research Center (LaRC) in the summer of 2015.  
The test aircraft were outfitted with a variety of commercially available ELT systems, 
Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, a.k.a. “crash test dummies”), and an onboard Data 
Acquisition System (DAS). Additionally, each airframe included two non-functional, or 
“dummy”, ELT installations for the purpose of recording dynamic loading conditions experienced 
by the antenna cables. ATD response data were used to establish the severity of pilot/co-pilot 
injury and is the subject of another technical report [2]. The ELT installation plans were varied 
throughout the series in order to assess how performance may be affected by system installation. 
Airframe response data supported calibration of a set of computer models that were used to assess 
ELT system installation performance under a wider variety of crash scenarios than had been 
previously tested [3].  
The ELT systems tested were representative of typical installations found onboard General 
Aviation (GA) aircraft and included nine different models from six different manufacturers. Of the 
fourteen total ELTs included in the series, three had been exposed to vibration testing in 
accordance with Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) environmental test 
standards in order to assess the effect of pre-crash conditioning. None of the units were re-used 
after crash testing and all were disassembled and inspected for internal damage.  
Each ELT was registered with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and 
permission was sought and granted for performing live tests of each installed system. This allowed 
for positive confirmation of full functionality before, during and after the crash tests as data 
collected by the Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking (SARSAT) system was made 
available for review. 
Analysis of the test and computer simulation data will guide ELT system installation 
recommendations that will produce performance gains in real-world aviation accidents, leading to 
safer, less costly, and more effective SAR operations. These recommendations will be made to the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) via RTCA Special Committee 229 (SC-229), which was 
established in December 2013. Initial release of the Second Generation 406 MHz ELT 
performance specification, RTCA DO-204B, is currently scheduled for no earlier than 2017. 
Background 
Typical aircraft operations include an Automatic-Fixed (AF) type ELT. In an AF installation, the 
beacon is mounted to the primary structure of the airframe, most often in the aft section, and 
connected to an externally-mounted antenna by a coaxial cable and associated connectors. Later 
models also include a remote control switch with aural and visual status indicators in the cockpit. 
For the purposes of this document, the term “ELT” refers to the AF-type of system. 
 3 
 
 
The vast majority of ELTs are passive-sensing systems relying on internal battery power and 
utilizing a mechanical g-switch to activate the system when a crash event is detected. The 
performance characteristic of the crash sensor is established by RTCA-approved regulations and 
essentially requires the system to activate due to a change in velocity greater than 5 feet/second 
opposite the direction of flight, but not less than 2 times the force of gravity or 10 milliseconds of 
force application [4]. 
Once activated, the ELT broadcasts a distress signal at 406 MHz, the internationally protected 
frequency for SAR.  Transmissions received by SARSAT satellite assets are relayed to Local User 
Terminals (LUTs) on Earth, which in turn supply the processed data to Mission Control Centers 
(MCCs). The appropriate Rescue Coordinate Center (RCC) or foreign SAR Point of Contact 
(SPOC) is then alerted and SAR operations commence. 
The Emergency Locator Transmitter Survivability and Reliability (ELTSAR) Study was 
formulated to investigate the performance and failure modes of current generation ELT systems. 
It is important to note the term “current” because much of the available literature and aviation 
crash reports include older generation ELT designs that have since been improved. Furthermore, 
the majority of in-service systems, particularly in GA – the largest contributing segment to all 
aviation accidents [5], continue to be of the older variety [6].  
The issue of scarcity of detailed performance data related to the latest generation of ELTs makes 
statistical analysis by means of crash report or literature review a tremendous challenge. 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that performance gains have been realized since the 25% successful 
operation rate reported over the period 1983-1987 [7]. A more contemporary study, such as the 
one published by the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau in 2013, cited successful ELT 
operations in 40-60% of “high g-force accidents” reported to them over the period 1993-2012 and 
scarcity of data is also highlighted [8].  
Through a thorough review of the available literature and a focused set of crash report records 
provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), a series of environmental tests 
were designed and performed, each with the goal of examining one or more recurring failure modes 
in current generation ELTs. The findings related to component or sub-system testing will be 
included in the technical report that will summarize the entire study, including the crash tests that 
are the subject of this document, as well as the initial literature review [1]. 
Test Facility 
All aircraft were tested at the Landing and Impact Research (LandIR) facility, shown in Figure 1, 
at NASA LaRC.  The LandIR facility was built in 1965 for use by the Apollo astronauts to practice 
lunar landings.  Since the mid-1970s, it has been used as a full-scale aircraft crash and spacecraft 
landing test facility. Crash testing has been conducted in the past for evaluation of safety features 
[9], some of which have included ELTs [10].  
LandIR is a unique facility used to impart combined forward and vertical velocities onto test 
articles at complex impact attitudes, which create more realistic crash conditions and scenarios 
than those tests conducted by pure vertical drops. The facility uses a pendulum-like swing system 
to lift and swing the test articles into the ground and pitch rate can be varied or eliminated.  
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At the predetermined drop height (up to 240 feet), a pyrotechnic system severs the pullback cabling 
from the test article, causing it to swing in a pendulum-like flight path toward a location on the 
ground. Immediately before ground contact, onboard pyrotechnics sever the swing cable 
attachments, causing the test article to be in a free flight-like condition prior to impact.  
The LandIR facility is capable of lifting and swinging test articles up to 32 tons in weight. 
Combinations of swing cable length, drop height, angle of attack, impact surface and location can 
all be varied, creating a wide range of impact conditions. 
Figure 1 - Landing and Impact Research Facility (LandIR) 
Crash Test Series 
During the summer of 2015, three Cessna 172 GA aircraft were crash tested at the LandIR facility 
for the evaluation of ELT system-level performance and generation of airframe response data to 
be used for analysis model calibration purposes [11]. This particular aircraft model was chosen 
because research showed no correlation between airplane make or model and ELT performance, 
and GA is the highest contributing segment to aviation accidents. Figure 2 shows the airplanes 
acquired for testing. 
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Figure 2 - Cessna 172 test articles 
The three test scenarios represented three different types of crash landing conditions. The first 
scenario simulated a pilot attempting to conduct an emergency landing on a prepared surface such 
as a runway or road, and proceeding to flare-to-stall the airplane above the ground, causing a large 
vertical sink rate.  The second and third tests represented controlled flight into terrain scenarios. 
The second test oriented the airplane in a nose-down configuration, simulating a pilot unknowingly 
flying directly into the terrain, while the third test represented a condition where the pilot 
unsuccessfully attempts to pull the airplane up to avoid terrain impact, resulting in a tail-strike 
condition. All scenarios were designed to produce severe but human-survivable crash 
environments. 
Multiple ELTs were mounted onboard each airplane in a variety of schemes that were 
representative of common installation plans. These plans were developed with input from certified 
aviation technicians and observation of numerous system installations onboard in-service aircraft. 
All system installations satisfied FAA requirements for local mounting surface strength, rigidity 
and airframe modification. Beacon locations, antenna locations, and antenna cabling treatment 
were varied amongst the test set as well.  For the purposes of reporting, the term ELT or ELT 
system will be used to refer to the entire system (beacon, mounting tray, cabling and antenna) as a 
whole, while the term ELT beacon, or simply beacon will refer to the main box-like unit containing 
the crash sensor.  Where applicable, the antennas and antenna cabling will be identified separately.  
Beacons are attached to the airplane using their mounting tray, which is typically a molded plastic 
or metallic plate, and a clasping mechanism which are included when purchasing the beacon.  The 
mounting tray then interfaces to the aircraft attachment plate, which is a custom designed and 
machined metallic plate fastened to the aircraft structure, and is typically unique for each 
installation.   
Of particular interest was to determine how the beacon location may affect crash-sensing and 
crashworthiness of the system given that current standards recommend installing the beacon in the 
aft-most section of the airframe as practicable.  This guidance is based on crashworthiness, and 
may be at odds with crash-sensing since the energy dissipated in deforming forward and mid-
airframe stations during a crash sequence may decrease the loads experienced by a beacon in the 
aft section to levels below crash-sensor activation threshold requirements. In fact, previous studies 
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stated these same concerns, resulting in recommendations to mount the crash-sensor forward of 
traditional beacon locations [12]-[13].   
Another area of interest was the relative location of the antenna with respect to the beacon and the 
treatment given to the antenna cabling system. Current performance standards include several 
“best practice” recommendations that include not crossing airframe production breaks with the 
cable run, providing “some slack” in the cables and using tethers to attach the cable to the airframe. 
While all of these recommendations appear to be sound, the installation schemes tested during the 
crash series included some that did not follow all best practices. The “dummy” ELT installations 
were utilized to further help quantify the loading environment experienced by cabling systems as 
a function of whether or not airframe production breaks were crossed and whether or not slack was 
provided in the cabling run. In all cases, tethers were used to protect cables from being snagged or 
pulled before or during the tests.  
Test Article Preparation  
All three airplanes were prepped in a similar manner to facilitate crash testing. An onboard 64 
channel DAS was installed to collect airframe, ELT, and ATD accelerations and loads. ELT 
accelerometers measuring horizontal (fore/aft), vertical and lateral accelerations were bonded via 
epoxy directly onto the ELT beacon outer casing. Accelerometers were also fastened to the ELT 
beacon aircraft attachment plates both in the horizontal and vertical directions. By measuring 
accelerations on both the ELT beacon and aircraft attachment plate, differences in responses, if 
any, could be directly measured and compared, and an evaluation of the performance of the beacon 
mounting could be performed. Accelerometers mounted in a horizontal direction generally were 
aligned with the sensing axis of a single axis sensing ELT beacon, and vertical accelerometers 
were oriented perpendicular to the sensing axis.  In most cases, this convention ran parallel to the 
airplane data collection convention, with horizontal accelerations in the aircraft coordinate system 
aligned with the thrust/drag directions, with forward being positive.  Vertical accelerations were 
aligned with the lift/weight directions, with positive being upward.  All data were sampled at 10 
kHz, and the DAS was controlled via Cat 5e umbilical cabling, running between each test article 
and the control room.  
Monochromatic ruggedized onboard high speed cameras, filming at 500 Hz, were focused on ATD 
responses and ELT beacon-to-mounting tray and aircraft mounting plate interaction. All high 
speed cameras and DAS data were synchronized using a common IRIG-B time code signal. 
Additional high definition cameras were installed around the interior and exterior of each test 
article to capture any significant item or event of interest. Camera location was determined by the 
ELT installation specifications and experimentation layout for each particular airplane, and was 
unique for each test.  
Table 1 shows the ELT installation matrix. The ELTs used in testing were a 50/50 combination of 
purchased and manufacturer donated units. All ELTs were new and unmodified when installed in 
the airplanes, with the exception of a subset which underwent “robust” vibration testing in 
accordance with RTCA standards [14] prior to installation. These units are designated with ‘vib’ 
after their ‘Make’ identifier. In cases where antennas were not supplied by the ELT manufacturer, 
additional antennas and coaxial cables were procured and/or fabricated in-house.  
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All ELTs underwent functionality testing after receipt at LaRC and again subsequent to installation 
onboard the aircraft. Tests consisted of performing the internal self-test described in each 
manufacturer’s operations manual, a manual hand shake test, and manual activation.  
A successful self-test was indicated by the return of no error codes as reported by the beacon. A 
successful manual hand shake test was confirmed by placing the beacon in the “ARMED” mode 
and shaking the beacon rapidly by hand and observing automatic activation of the beacon and 
transmission of the 406 MHz distress signal to a beacon tester connected to the antenna coaxial 
cable output. During manual activation testing, the beacon was switched to the “ON” mode and 
transmission of the 406 MHz distress signal over the air via the ELT external antenna was 
confirmed with a local beacon monitor. Satellite transmission data were provided by NOAA and 
NASA SAR to confirm that the distress signals carried the appropriate information at sufficient 
power to be received in space. Each system passed all tests upon receipt and final installation 
onboard the aircraft.     
Two “dummy ELT” systems were installed on each airplane. These dummy systems were 
specifically used to measure tension in the antenna cable during each crash test. The system 
contained a 3 lb. steel mass simulating the ELT beacon. The mass contained a Bayonet Neill-
Concelman (BNC) terminal connection attached to an inline load cell, capable of reading tension 
and compression loads to 1,000 lb. The antenna cable attached to the BNC terminal and was routed 
in the same manner as a live ELT antenna cable, and like a normal beacon, each dummy cable was 
attached to an external antenna. A dummy unit was used to measure the loads because it was not 
possible to incorporate an in-line load cell with a live beacon without causing signal disruption. 
Each dummy beacon mass also contained a horizontal and vertical sensing accelerometer, in order 
to compare dummy mass to actual ELT beacon accelerations installed on each aircraft. The two 
dummy ELTs for each test are labeled “Dummy 1” and “Dummy 2” in Table 1. 
A combination of purchased and NASA fabricated antenna cables were used in testing. Many of 
the antenna cables were included with the purchased ELTs when practical. Additional cabling was 
fabricated by NASA in-house certified aircraft technicians for either extended cable runs or to 
provide comparisons to purchased ELT cabling. Antenna cable systems are identified by the 
fabrication pedigree and coaxial cable type. Note that for ELTs 4 and 7 of Test 3, the cables were 
provided with purchased ELT units, but were unmarked. 
Table 1 also contains columns defining in generality where each ELT beacon and antenna was 
located on each airplane. These general designations are provided for completeness and quick 
comparisons. The individual test sections will show precise installed locations for all ELT beacons 
and antennas.  
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Table 1 – ELT installation matrix 
Test 1 
ELT  Beacon 
Make 
(Mfr.) 
Beacon 
Model 
Beacon 
Orientation 
on Airframe 
Beacon 
Airframe 
Station 
Antenna 
Location 
Antenna 
Type 
Antenna 
Cable System 
Pedigree  
Antenna 
Cable Type 
Antenna 
Cable 
Length 
1 1 1 Left Side Aft of 90 Cabin Whip NASA RG400 36” 
2 1 2 Right Side Aft of 140 Aft Tail Whip NASA RG400 45” 
3 2 (vib) 3 Floor Aft of 65 Cabin Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 36” 
4 2 3 Floor Aft of 65 Fwd Tail Whip NASA RG400 108” 
5 Dummy 1 N/A Left Side 65 Fwd Tail Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 36” 
6 Dummy 2 N/A Right Side 65 Aft Tail Whip NASA RG400 118” 
Test 2 
ELT  Beacon 
Make 
(Mfr.) 
Beacon 
Model 
Beacon 
Orientation 
on Airframe 
Beacon 
Airframe 
Station 
Antenna 
Location 
Antenna 
Type 
Antenna 
Cable System 
Pedigree  
Antenna 
Cable Type 
Antenna 
Cable 
Length 
1 3 (vib) 4 Ceiling, 45° Aft of 65 Cabin Rod NASA RG400 24” 
2 1 (vib) 5 Ceiling Aft of 108 Aft Tail Rod NASA RG400 24” 
3 4 6 Left Side Aft of 108 Fwd Tail Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 72” 
4 2 3 Right Side Aft of 108 Cabin Whip NASA RG400 108” 
5 3 4 Floor Aft of 65 Cabin Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 36” 
6 Dummy 1 N/A Floor 90 Fwd Tail Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 36” 
7 Dummy 2 N/A Side 90 Aft Tail Whip NASA RG400 72” 
Test 3 
ELT  Beacon 
Make 
(Mfr.) 
Beacon 
Model 
Beacon 
Orientation 
on Airframe 
Beacon 
Airframe 
Station 
Antenna 
Location 
Antenna 
Type 
Antenna 
Cable System 
Pedigree  
Antenna 
Cable Type 
Antenna 
Cable 
Length 
1 4 7 Floor Aft of 65 Cabin Whip MIL-DTL-17 RG142 72” 
2 5 8 Left Side Aft of 108 Fwd Tail Whip NASA RG400 48” 
3 3 4 Right Side Aft of 65 Fwd Tail Whip NASA RG400 72” 
4 5 8 Right Side Aft of 108 Aft Tail Whip *Unmarked *Unmarked 72” 
5 6 9 Floor Aft of 65 Cabin Whip NASA RG400 48” 
6 Dummy 1 N/A Floor 65 Aft Tail Whip NASA RG400 96” 
7 Dummy 2 N/A Right Side 65 Fwd Tail Whip *Unmarked *Unmarked 72” 
 
All ELT beacon aircraft attachment hardware custom designed and fabricated at LaRC met current 
RTCA standards [4]. For ELT beacons which were to be floor mounted, 0.09-in. thick aluminum 
6061 plates were used as doubler plates and riveted directly into the cabin subfloor support 
channels. For ELT beacons which were to be sidewall mounted, 0.09-in. thick aluminum 6061 
plates were machined to fasten to two longitudinal stringers. Holes were drilled into the plates at 
locations specified by the specific ELT mounting bracket. Figure 3 shows an example floor 
mounted doubler plate while Figure 4 shows an example sidewall aircraft attachment plate. 
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Figure 3 – Example floor mounted aircraft attachment doubler plate 
Figure 4 - Example sidewall aircraft attachment plate 
In two instances, a ceiling mounted beacon configuration was used to replicate a helicopter 
installation. Per manufacturer guidance, 1-axis sensing ELT beacons are mounted to the cabin 
ceiling in a 45 degree nose-down orientation. This configuration addresses differences in both 
crash and normal vibration environments between rotorcraft and fixed wing aircraft. 
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All ELT remote switch connections were wired into their respective switches and mounted in 
series onto a plate on the airplane instrument panel. Cabling was routed beneath the cabin floor 
and fastened to frame sections for beacons in the tail. A high definition camera was focused solely 
on the remote switch panel to observe and record status light indications during checkout and test 
procedures.  
ELT performance during and after the crash tests was confirmed by a variety of methods: 
 Visual Inspection – The status of the beacon and remote switch visual and aural indicators, 
component connections and mounting structures were noted during pre- and post-test 
inspection of each aircraft. 
 Radio – A hand-held radio was tuned to 121.5 MHz to confirm broadcast of local homing 
signals. Note, this method does not provide identification of the beacons(s) responsible for 
the broadcast. 
 Video – Onboard cameras were oriented to observe status indicator lights on the remote 
switches and beacons, whenever possible, in order to confirm automatic activation of the 
ELTs.  
 Beacon Monitor – A local beacon monitor was stationed in the LandIR control room to 
acquire and document 406 MHz distress signal transmissions, including the unique 15 Hex 
ID assigned to each beacon transmission that was received and processed.  
 SARSAT – Satellite transmission data were provided by NOAA and NASA SAR 
subsequent to each test. The data sets included, among other things, the beacon 15 Hex ID 
associated with each transmission, transmission receipt time, and the particular satellite 
asset that received the transmission. 
Airplane rigging required for test, along with details regarding airframe acceleration locations, 
acceleration response, impact conditions, and general test details can be found in [11]. However, 
summaries are provided for each test within its individual section.  The final weight and balance 
for each airplane is listed in Table 2.  Each aircraft was in its “Normal” category as defined by 
each aircraft’s Pilot Operating Handbook. The horizontal Center of Gravity (CG) is measured from 
the firewall, the lateral CG is measured from the aircraft centerline, and the vertical CG is measured 
from the ground. The column labeled “Moment / 1000” is calculated by multiplying the weight 
and horizontal CG. The entire data set is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2  - Aircraft test article weight and CG properties 
Test Weight (lb.) Horizontal 
CG (in.) 
Lateral CG 
(in.) 
Vertical CG 
(in.) 
Moment / 
1000 (in.-lb.) 
Category 
1 2,000 44.5  0.0 46.3 89 Normal 
2 2,114  39.5 0.0 48.1 101 Normal 
3 2,072 42.5 0.0 50.8 89 Normal 
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Since ELT crash-sensors are designed in accordance with a minimum change in velocity, or “delta-
v”, specification, each test section contains the delta-v computed from the measured accelerations 
at beacon locations. The delta-v section also includes the timeframe in which the computation was 
performed.  A set of acceleration traces from each test can be found in [11].  
 
A diagram showing station locations is shown in Figure 5.  For general nomenclature, station 0 
represents the firewall, stations 16 through 108 represent the cabin of the airplane, stations 108 
through 140 represent the forward tail, stations 140 through 172 represent the mid-tail, and aft of 
172 is the aft tail.   
 
Figure 5 - Station locations for a Cessna 172 
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Test 1 Results 
The original ELT for the Test 1 airplane was still present when the airplane was delivered to LaRC.  
The beacon was floor mounted beneath the rear bench seat on the pilot side of the cabin and the 
antenna cable was routed through an access hole in the cabin subfloor and into the external antenna 
located in the tail, directly behind station 108. The beacon was mounted onto an aluminum doubler 
plate, which was riveted into the subfloor support channels. Figure 6 shows the original ELT 
installation after removal of the aircraft interior components. 
Figure 6 - Test 1 original airplane ELT beacon installation as viewed from the pilot door (left) 
and pilot seat looking aft (right) 
The original ELT was removed, and four ELTs were installed in the airplane for Test 1. ELT 
beacon 1 was mounted on the pilot’s side wall in the aft cabin. ELT beacon 2 was mounted on the 
co-pilot side wall in the mid-tail. ELT beacons 3 and 4 were mounted in symmetric arrangement 
on the cabin floor in a location which would be under the rear seat. ELT beacon 3 replicated the 
original beacon location. Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of the beacons, in yellow, at 
their mounting locations, with some components from the airplane removed for clarity. 
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Figure 7 - Test 1 beacon configuration 
The two dummy ELT beacons were mounted just forward of the station 90 frame section, beneath 
the rear window on both the pilot and co-pilot side with the BNC/load cell connection facing 
forward, as shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Dummy ELT beacon installation for Test 1 (pilot side shown) 
 14 
 
 
Antenna locations for Test 1 are shown in Figure 9. ELT installations 1, 2 and 3 followed current 
RTCA best practice guidelines by not crossing airframe production breaks when locating the 
antenna relative to the beacon and mounting them as close to the respective beacons as practicable. 
The cabling was secured to the frames of the aircraft via tie wraps. ELT installation 4, along with 
the two dummy ELTs, intentionally did not follow best practice guidelines to provide comparisons. 
ELT installation 4 used a 108-in. long cable, which had to be run from the floor of the cabin, up 
around the co-pilot rear door frame, along the ceiling and then into the antenna, which was located 
around the station 108 frame. Similarly, cabling for dummy beacon 2, which was located near 
beacon 3 on the co-pilot side, ran along the co-pilot side of the airframe, and then the ceiling until 
it attached to dummy antenna 2, located near the station 140 frame section.  
Figure 9 - Antenna locations for Test 1 
Multiple activation checkouts were performed on the units prior to test day, both by performing 
the self-test function on the ELT beacons and by turning the ELTs to “ON” mode and reviewing 
satellite transmission feedback from NOAA and NASA SAR. The final checkout was conducted 
on test day with a self-test being performed on each ELT approximately 1 hour before the crash 
test occurred. The final self-test indicated that the ELTs were all functioning normally immediately 
prior to the crash test. 
Test 1 occurred on July 1, 2015. The airplane impacted the concrete surface at a flight path velocity 
of 64.4 ft./sec. at an Angle of Attack (AoA) of 1.5 degrees nose high. The main landing gear 
compressed enough to allow the tail to strike the surface approximately 0.125 sec. after initial 
impact.  The airplane rebounded with a large amount of residual horizontal velocity, which was 
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then stopped by the catch net. The time between the initial impact and the first catch net contact 
was 0.475 sec., however the net capture occurred at approximately 0.800 sec. after initial impact. 
At a point during the net capture, the airplane tail impacted the ground a second time, causing a 
small portion of the lower tail to break free from the airplane.  The airplane came to rest 
approximately 5.85 sec. after initial ground impact. Figure 10 shows the impact sequence.  
Figure 10 - Test 1 impact sequence 
Other than minor damage in the nose gear mounting location and rear tail piece which broke free, 
the airplane appeared to be largely undamaged after the impact. Visual inspections confirmed that 
all ELT beacons remained seated in their mounting trays, with no structural failures detected on 
the mounting tray, aircraft attachment plates or beacons due to the ground impact or net capture 
events. Acceleration data captured from accelerometers mounted directly to the beacons are plotted 
in Figure 11. Accelerations for all beacons and aircraft attachment plates presented in this report 
are filtered at a SAE Channel Filter Class (CFC) 60 low-pass filter [15].  
 
Test 1 is unique from the other tests because there are two very distinct impact events seen both in 
the image series and in the data. The first event is the ground contact, which consists of primarily 
a vertical deceleration of the airplane causing primarily landing gear deformation. The second, 
starting at approximately 0.475 sec. after the ground contact and lasting through approximately 
1.6 sec. is the net capture, which is primarily a horizontal deceleration event. Note that single-axis-
sensing beacons were mounted with the sensing direction aligned with the horizontal net capture 
event, which is in the direction of flight. ELT beacon accelerations in both the horizontal and 
vertical directions are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 – ELT beacon accelerations from Test 1 
Vertical accelerations during the ground impact event reached peak values of 12.7, 18.1 10.1 and 
12.7 g for ELT beacons 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.  The maximum values occur 0.125 sec. after 
impact, and are due to the tail strike condition.   ELT beacon 2 is closest to the tail and has the 
highest maximum peak accelerations.  All peaks resemble a trapezoidal pulse shape with a sharp 
spike at the end.  The duration of the pulse was 0.300 sec. with rise and fall times of 0.050 sec., 
and a sustained time of 0.200 sec.  Another spike in acceleration occurs at 1.36 sec. after impact.  
This spike is due to a second tail strike which occurred during the net catch.  The duration of this 
impact was approximately 0.030 sec. with maximums close to 10 g for ELT beacons 1, 3 and 4, 
and 15 g for ELT beacon 2. 
Horizontal accelerations, which are shown in the lower plot in Figure 11 are mainly concentrated 
between 0.800 and 1.600 sec.  There are short spikes which occur during the ground contact portion 
of the impact event, and oscillate between -3 and 3 g initially.  The main portion of horizontal 
acceleration is evidenced from the net capture.  The ground impact event is complete by 0.475 sec. 
after impact, after which the airplane makes contact with the net.  Little acceleration is seen 
between 0.475 and 0.800 sec. after impact, mainly due to the net breaking away from the supports 
and beginning to wrap around the airplane.  The actual capture begins 0.800 sec. after impact 
where the net tension begins to pull the drag weights in order to decelerate the airplane.  The 
deceleration reaches maximums of 5.1, 5.5, 5.1 and 5.2 g for ELT beacons 1, 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively.  The pulse is triangular in shape.  
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Change in velocity, which is simply the integrated acceleration signal from the plots show in Figure 
11 is presented in Table 3.  Data are computed in the vertical direction at ground contact between 
times 0.000 and 0.400 sec., and computed in the horizontal direction during net contact and catch, 
between times 0.800 and 1.600 sec.  For reference, peak accelerations described above are also 
included.  It should be noted that these delta-v results are substantially higher than what is required 
for automatic activation of the ELT [4].   
 
Table 3 - Delta velocity and peak accelerations for Test 1  
 
Data acquired from each of the beacons aircraft attachment plates were next examined to determine 
whether large differences in acceleration both in the horizontal and vertical directions were 
present.  Comparisons between the plates and the ELT beacons showed almost identical 
acceleration response, with only very minor differences either due to minor variability in the 
sensors, location and/or filtering.  The vertical acceleration plots are shown in Figure 12 while 
horizontal accelerations are shown in Figure 13.  All ELTs used in Test 1 complied with the latest 
applicable Technical Standard Order (TSO) from the FAA [16]. 
Figure 12 - Test 1 beacon to aircraft attachment plate vertical acceleration comparisons 
ELT Vertical Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Vertical Delta-
v (ft./sec.) 
Horiozntal Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Horizontal 
Delta-v (ft./sec.) 
1 12.7 36.84 5.1 37.40 
2 18.1 38.96 5.5 35.26 
3 10.1 35.11 5.1 39.76 
4 12.7 35.09 5.2 39.42 
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Figure 13 - Test 1 beacon to aircraft attachment plate horizontal acceleration comparisons 
The resultant accelerations both in the horizontal and vertical directions demonstrate that the 
various mechanisms used for securing the beacons to their trays in Test 1 were all sufficiently 
rigid.  Furthermore, when examining acceleration data gathered from the tests, the entire ELT, 
mounting tray and aircraft attachment plate assembly can be thought of as a single rigid body 
experiencing a single acceleration profile.  Consequently, comparative results from the ELT 
beacon-to-aircraft attachment plate will not be reported further in this report, unless anomalous 
behavior is evident. 
Cable loads were minimal in the dummy antenna cables due to the large amount of slack present 
in both of the dummy cable lengths. Since cables were slack, maximum loads developed were less 
than 2 lb. for both cables. No antenna cabling showed signs of damage or pullout from the 
attachment points.  Figure 14 shows the results. 
Figure 14 - Test 1 dummy antenna cable loads 
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Accelerations in the dummy masses closely follow the accelerations seen in the instrumented 
beacons. Acceleration traces exhibited much more noise in their signals, primarily due to being 
mounted directly onto the aircraft skin which exhibited much more oscillation than other 
components.  Figure 15 shows the dummy ELT results.  
Figure 15 - Test 1 dummy ELT beacon accelerations 
All four of the ELTs activated automatically and transmitted during the test. Since Test 1 was 
comprised of two major separate impact events, ELT beacon activation timing is critical to 
determining whether ground impact or net capture led to the distress signal transmissions. A 
sequence of events was reconstructed by examining when the visual status indicator lights on the 
beacons and remote switches illuminated. The analysis included the utilization of timing data, 
frame rate information and the common DAS/camera time-code from each of the cameras to 
reconstruct a complete timeline.  The timeline showing the first indicated illumination is overlaid 
onto the aircraft engine acceleration data in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 - Test 1 LED illumination timing 
ELT beacon 3 was the only beacon that clearly sensed the initial ground impact event, consisting 
of the high vertical (cross-axis with respect to the sensitive direction of the crash sensor) 
acceleration.  The light illumination occurred at 0.100 sec. after impact, which is in the middle of 
the ground contact acceleration pulse.  ELT beacon 3 was a single axis sensing beacon which had 
undergone vibration tests, which are described in more detail below, prior to being used for the 
crash test.  The other three ELT beacons showed LED illumination occurring more than 1 sec. 
after impact, either during or after the net capture.     
However, what is unknown is the time delay between when the three ELT beacons sense the crash 
event and when the LED lights illuminate.  A subset of data does exist from previous drop testing 
conducted on the same make and model (but different physical unit) for ELT 1 [1] and can provide 
a partial answer for that particular beacon.  In a subset from 5 of 48 drop tests where both the 
impact and LED could be seen, the average length of time between first contact of the drop mass 
and LED illumination was 0.474 sec. and ranged between 0.464 and 0.484 sec.  Using the average 
number as the time delay, the actual ELT beacon activation time shifts to 0.942 sec. after impact, 
which was near the beginning of the airplane deceleration due to the net capture.  It is clear that 
ELT beacon 1 activated because of the net contact, and not due to the ground contact.   Data, 
unfortunately, do not exist for ELT beacons 2 and 4, so no further interpretations could be made.   
ELTs 3 and 4 were identical models, purchased in the spring of 2015. ELT 3 had undergone robust 
random vibration testing in accordance with the RTCA standard prior to being installed onboard 
the aircraft. After Test 1 was conducted, all ELTs were removed from the airplane and 
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disassembled to inspect for damage or wear. The crash-sensors from ELT beacons 3 and 4, 
comprising of mechanical g-switches in this case, were then removed and part of the cylinder wall 
was carefully cut away to reveal the internal ball and spring mechanism.  
As Figure 17 shows, wear from the vibration tests did create a marked location inside the cylinder 
(highlighted), and noticeable discoloration on the compressive side (left) of the marked line. This 
location is where the ball diameter would rest when not under compressive (or impulsive loading). 
It was not determined whether the spring stiffness changed due to the vibration testing; however, 
the automatic activation performance of ELT 3 was noted to have changed throughout that test 
series with a higher cross-axis sensitivity and altered in-line sensitivity. Further details regarding 
the entire vibration test series will be provided in the comprehensive report published after the 
conclusion of the study [1].  Other than the noticeable line and discoloration, there were no 
additional noticeable differences between the g-switches for ELT beacons 3 and 4. 
Figure 17 – G-switch comparisons between ELT beacons 3 and 4 for Test 1 
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Test 2 Results 
The configuration of the Test 2 ELT beacons is shown in the graphic in Figure 18. Test 2 included 
a ceiling mounted beacon, oriented in a 45 degree nose-down configuration, simulating a 
helicopter installation for ELT beacon 1. ELT beacon 2 was also ceiling mounted; however, 
because it included a 6-axis crash-sensor, it was oriented in a level configuration per 
manufacturer’s instructions.  ELT beacon 3 was mounted to the side wall of the forward tail section 
on the pilot side. ELT beacon 4 was also side wall mounted; however, it was located in the mid-
tail section on the co-pilot side. ELT beacon 5 was floor mounted in the main cabin on the pilot 
side. Dummy beacon 1 was installed on the cabin floor next to ELT beacon 5. Dummy beacon 2 
was installed similarly to Test 1, on the co-pilot side, underneath the rear window. 
Figure 18 - Test 2 ELT beacon configuration 
A combination of rod and whip antennas were used for Test 2. For the two helicopter ELT 
installations (ELTs 1 and 2), rod antennas were used per typical practice, and the remainder used 
whip antennas. Figure 19 shows the antenna locations, in black, on the rear cabin and forward tail, 
with approximate beacon interior locations also identified in red. The blue connecting line is an 
illustration to show the cable run between the beacon and antenna. ELTs 1, 2 and 3 all used best 
practice guidelines in trying to keep the antenna as close to the beacon as possible and without 
crossing airframe production breaks. Since beacons 1 and 2 were both ceiling mounted, the cable 
was a short 24-in. in length. The longest cable was used on the installation of ELT 4. This cable 
spanned four production breaks, connecting the ELT near station 140 to the antenna near station 
65.  
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Unlike Test 1, the dummy ELT 1 antenna was very short. Dummy ELT 2, however, ran from the 
side window location at station 90 to the rearmost antenna near station 205. The antenna at station 
205 was the rearmost mounted antenna amongst all three tests. As with Test 1, all cabling was 
secured via tie wraps to frame sections. 
Figure 19 - Antenna locations for Test 2 with cable runs annotated 
Test 2 occurred on July 29, 2015. The airplane CG impacted the soil at a flight path velocity of 
74.4 ft./sec., consisting of a 68.6 ft./sec. horizontal and 28.7 ft./sec. vertical velocity components, 
resulting in an impact velocity vector angled at 21.6 degrees. The AoA was 12.2 degrees nose 
down with a pitch rate of +16.1 deg./sec. The airplane nose gear impacted the soil first, and then 
immediately began plowing into the soil. After 0.111 sec., the left wing separated away from the 
fuselage, and 0.169 sec. after impact, buckling initiated in the tail near the station 108 frame 
section. The airplane started to flip over 0.240 sec. after the initial impact. At some point during 
the flip, the nose gear broke away from the nose section of the airplane. At 1.976 sec. after the 
impact, the airplane orientation was upside-down. The airplane rocked back and forth for a few 
seconds before finally coming to rest 6.790 sec. after impact. Figure 20 shows the impact sequence. 
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Figure 20 – Test 2 impact sequence 
As shown in Figure 21, ELT beacons 1 and 5 show the highest horizontal accelerations during the 
impact, with peaks of 26.1 and 23.2 g, occurring at 0.145 sec. and 0.107 sec. after impact.  It should 
be noted that both ELT beacons 1 and 5 were mounted in the cabin of the airplane, on the ceiling 
for ELT beacon 1 and on the floor for ELT beacon 5.  ELT beacon 1 was the only ELT used in all 
tests which did not follow instrumentation orientation consistent with the airframe coordinate 
system.  Instead, the two accelerometers mounted on ELT beacon 1 were mounted in the ELT 
beacon sensing direction and perpendicular to the ELT beacon sensing direction, respectively.  For 
purposes of reporting, the ELT beacon accelerations are not transformed into the airplane 
coordinate system because it is important to show the accelerations experienced by the ELT in the 
beacon sensing direction.  Therefore, the results from ELT beacon 1 shown in Figure 21 do not  
follow the acceleration traces acquired from the other ELT beacons.  
ELT beacons 2, 3, and 4 show similar results, both in magnitude and in shape of horizontal 
accelerations from the impact.  The accelerations are presumably similar due to the close proximity 
of mounting locations of the beacons in the tail.  These accelerations approximate a trapezoidal 
shaped pulse, with a sustained acceleration duration of 0.63 sec. at average values of 10.3, 12.0 
and 10.7 g, for ELT beacons 2, 3 and 4, respectively.   
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Figure 21 – ELT beacon accelerations from Test 2 
Vertical accelerations, as shown in Figure 21, from the test closely matched between ELT beacons 
2 through 5. The vertical accelerometer orientation on ELT beacon 1 was oriented at a 45 degree 
angle. Combined with a 12.2 degree nose down impact angle, the vertical accelerometer mounted 
on ELT beacon 1 was actually measuring accelerations at a 57.2 degree angle from the vertical, 
relative to the ground. It is because of this angle offset that the vertical accelerometer was 
measuring the complementary angle of acceleration relative to the flight path angle of 21.6 degrees, 
and thus, not registering high accelerations.  
The vertical accelerations from ELT beacons 2 through 5 approximated a triangular shape with a 
duration of approximately 0.133 sec. Peak accelerations ranged between 19.3 g, which occurred 
on ELT beacon 2 to 24.2 g, which occurred on ELT beacon 5.   
Change in velocity, which is simply the integrated acceleration signal from the plots shown in 
Figure 21 is presented in Table 4.  Data are computed between 0.000 and 0.300 sec.  For reference, 
peak accelerations described above are also included.  Velocities resolved from ELT beacon 1 are 
in the beacon coordinate system. 
 
Table 4 - Delta velocity and peak accelerations for Test 2 
ELT Vertical Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Vertical Delta-v 
(ft./sec.) 
Horiozntal Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Horizontal 
Delta-v (ft./sec.) 
1 13.0 10.1 26.1 58.6 
2 19.3 54.3 14.4 36.1 
3 19.4 52.0 15.3 44.1 
4 21.1 48.2 16.3 39.7 
5 24.2 35.6 23.2 51.0 
 
Four out of the five ELTs activated and transmitted during the crash test with ELT 4 being the 
beacon that did not activate. During post-test inspections, the remote switch LED indicating 
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activation was noted as not illuminated or blinking. Since the beacon was in the tail of the airplane 
and inaccessible from visual inspection or aural cues, the remote switch light was the only 
indication as to whether it had activated when undergoing immediate post-test inspections. Neither 
the local beacon monitor nor SARSAT system reported a transmission from this beacon.  
Since the ELT beacon failed to automatically activate, the test procedure called for a self-test to 
be performed at the aircraft, immediately following the crash test, before any configuration 
changes occurred or equipment was disturbed. The self-test was successfully conducted via the 
remote switch, indicating that the connection between the ELT beacon and remote switch was 
intact and functional. The self-test produced an error code indicating “High VSWR or High 
Current,” according to the owner’s manual.  
While inspecting the ELT antenna connections on the airplane back in the preparation hangar, it 
was discovered that the antenna cable had partially pulled out of the end fitting on the end 
terminating at the antenna. Note that the cable run between the beacon and antenna for this 
particular ELT did not follow the best practice guideline suggestions. Figure 22 shows the 
connection post-test. Furthermore, when connected to a beacon tester during further post-test 
checkouts in the preparation hangar, the beacon successfully passed the self-test, manual shake 
test and manual activation test.  
Figure 22 - Test 2 ELT 4 antenna connection 
Antenna cable pullout from the end fitting may have been initiated by large deformation of the tail 
of the aircraft and relative motion of the antenna with respect to the beacon. There are two overall 
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conclusions from ELT 4.  First, the beacon did not activate, and second, had it activated, there is a 
chance the ELT would not have transmitted due to an antenna cabling connection pullout issue.  
Note that even with the airplane upside-down after coming to rest following the impact, the 
beacons which activated were able to transmit a signal to the SARSAT system.  ELT 1 and 5 
antennas were mostly obscured from the soil near where the roof was in contact with the ground, 
while the antennas for ELTs 2 and 3, located on the tail were pointing downward at the soil.  It is 
noteworthy that the activated beacons were able to successfully transmit the distress signal to the 
SARSAT system with the antennas in these orientations.   
The cable loads developed in the dummy ELT cables are shown in Figure 23. As with Test 1, the 
loads measured in the dummy cables were very low, reaching peaks of 12.2 and 2.1 lb. for dummy 
1 and 2, respectively. These loads occur in the first 0.200 sec. of the crash, which follows when 
the ELT beacons saw the acceleration pulses from the crash.  
Figure 23 - Test 2 dummy antenna cable loads 
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All ELT beacons were disassembled post-test, after functional checkouts had been completed, with 
the focus being on ELT 4.  The crash sensing unit, in this case a mechanical g-switch, from ELT 
beacon 4 was removed and the sidewall of the cylinder was carefully cut away.   Figure 24 shows 
the disassembled g-switch. 
Figure 24 – G-switch assembly for ELT beacon 4 on Test 2 
Post-test visual inspections of both the disassembled ELT beacon and g-switch revealed no 
obvious mechanical defects which would cause the beacon to fail to activate.  With the sidewall 
partially removed, the ball was moved to compress the spring without any noticeable obstruction.  
The performance issue on this ELT at this time is unexplained. 
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Test 3 Results 
As with the Test 1 aircraft, the Test 3 aircraft arrived at LaRC with the original ELT installation 
present. As shown in Figure 25, the beacon was installed on the co-pilot side, in the forward tail 
section, directly behind the cabin-to-tail transition area. The aircraft attachment plate did not 
follow current installation standard [4], and was riveted directly onto the skin, and not attached to 
any primary structural elements. The beacon was secured in its mount via a tie wrap located at the 
forward end and a leather buckle in the middle. The antenna was located near the beacon, centered 
on the tail at the same approximate station location. Note the tie wrap has been removed from the 
aircraft attachment plate view. 
Figure 25 - Test 3 original airplane ELT location (left) and aircraft attachment plate (right) 
Five ELTs were installed for Test 3. ELT beacons 1 and 5 made were in a symmetric configuration, 
behind the pilot and co-pilot, under the location where the rear seats would have been located at 
station 65.  ELT beacon 2 was mounted in the forward tail, on the pilot sidewall. ELT beacon 3 
was wall mounted on the co-pilot sidewall, at a location just aft of station 65. ELT beacon 4 was 
installed in the approximate location as the original beacon, on the co-pilot side just aft of station 
108. The original mounting plate was removed and a new mounting plate was used, which fastened 
to the airplane skin stiffeners in the tail. ELT beacons 2 and 4 were mounted such that they were 
in a symmetric arrangement along the airplane centerline. Dummy beacon 1 was located on the 
floor next to ELT beacon 1. Dummy beacon 2 was located on the co-pilot wall just below the rear 
window, next to ELT beacon 3.  These ELT locations are highlighted in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26 - Test 3 ELT beacon configuration 
For ELTs 1, 2 and 5, the shortest cable run distance was implemented. The ELT 4 cable originated 
at the beacon location just aft of station 108, ran through frames at stations 140 and 172, and 
terminated at an antenna located aft of station 172. ELT 3 antenna cabling crossed frames located 
at stations 90 and 108. The longest runs were the two dummy ELTs. Dummy ELT 1 cabling ran 
under the floor of the cabin, crossed frames at stations 108, 140 and 172 and terminated at an 
antenna aft of station 172. The cable length was chosen such that the cable developed significant 
tension when attached to the beacon and antenna. Dummy ELT 2 included an antenna located 
forward of station 140. The cable, while having more slack than Dummy ELT 1, was purposely 
chosen to be almost the exact length as the run needed, causing very little slack to be present.  
Figure 27 shows an illustration of the ELT beacon (in red) and antenna locations (in black), with 
the cable runs noted. 
Figure 27 – Antenna locations for Test 3 with cable runs annotated 
Test 3 occurred on August 26, 2015. The airplane CG impacted the soil at a flight path velocity of 
66.1 ft./sec., consisting of a 56.9 ft./sec. horizontal and 23.6 ft./sec. vertical velocity components. 
The AoA was 8.0 degrees nose up with a pitch rate of +13.3 deg./sec.  
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There was a slight amount of roll (co-pilot high) and yaw (nose left) at impact. Due to these 
conditions, the pilot main gear impacted the soil initially. The tail contacted the soil 0.030 sec. 
after initial gear impact and the nose contacted the surface 0.116 sec. after impact. Similar to Test 
2, the nose gear penetrated the soil surface and acted as a pivot point for the airplane to rotate 
around. The airplane started to exhibit noticeable rotation shortly after nose contact. At 0.138 sec. 
after impact, tail failure occurred, causing a large fracture at the tail-cabin junction to appear. The 
airplane landed upside-down 1.53 sec. after impact and rocked back and forth for an additional 3 
seconds. The airplane came to rest approximately 5 sec. after initial impact. This sequence is 
depicted in Figure 28. 
Figure 28 - Test 3 impact sequence 
The airplane sustained major damage from the impact. Large amounts of deformation were seen 
in the engine area by the nose and firewall. The most noticeable failure that occurred was the tail 
separation from the cabin section. A fracture occurred at the tail-to-cabin transition area in the skin 
of the aircraft, causing the skin to fail on three sides. The only material holding the tail onto the 
rest of the airplane was a small section on the bottom of this area, and the tail hinged about this 
section. This fracture occurred very early in the crash event, during the time the airplane was 
plowing into the soil. During the flip over, the hinging caused the tail to become oriented at a 90 
degree angle perpendicular to the fuselage creating a large opening at what would be the top of the 
tail/cabin connection.   
As shown in Figure 29, horizontal accelerations were triangular in shape, with a pulse duration of 
0.300 sec.  The peak acceleration values occurred for ELT beacons 1, 2, 3, and 5 at approximately 
0.168 sec. after impact, with the peak for ELT beacon 4 occurring a short time later at 0.200 sec.  
ELT beacon 4 showed more oscillations than the other ELT beacons, which affected its peak value.  
Visual inspections of the ELT beacon-to-mounting tray and aircraft attachment plate connections 
post-test revealed nothing unusual or loose regarding the instrumentation.  The noise was attributed 
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to physical differences in the sensors used.  The peak accelerations occur at the point where the 
airplane nose is plowing through the soil bed. At 0.300 sec. after impact, the plowing has ended, 
and it is at this point where the airplane first begins to flip over.  
 
As shown in Figure 29, the vertical accelerations resembled a trapezoidal shape of approximately 
0.250 sec. in duration, with two defined peaks at the beginning and end of the plateau.  The first 
peak occurs between 0.085 and 0.98 sec. after impact, depending on which ELT beacon is 
examined.  The second peak occurs at an average time of 0.167 sec after impact.  The first peak is 
due to the initial impact of the fuselage structure with the soil.  The airplane rotation in which the 
nose finally impacts the soil causes the second peak a short time later.  Maximum accelerations 
for the first peak range between 11.9 g for ELT beacon 1 and reach 19.4 g for ELT beacon 4.  For 
the second peak, accelerations are more uniform but slightly higher, ranging between 19.2 g for 
ELT beacon 5 and 23.7 for ELT beacon 4.   
 
Note that ELT beacons 2 and 4 are in symmetric arrangement in the forward tail, but experience 
large differences in the first peak of vertical accelerations.  This finding is likely due to the slight 
amount of roll at impact.  For the second peaks, which occur during the nose contact and plowing, 
the accelerations are more closely matched. 
 
Figure 29  ELT beacon accelerations from Test 3 
The change in velocity is presented in Table 5.  Data are computed between 0.000 and 0.400 sec.  
For reference, peak accelerations described above are also included. 
 
Table 5 - Delta velocity and peak accelerations for Test 3 
ELT Vertical Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Vertical Delta-v 
(ft./sec.) 
Horiozntal Peak 
Acceleration (g) 
Horizontal 
Delta-v (ft./sec.) 
1 20.2 49.1 16.0 41.2 
2 23.7 68.1 11.9 27.8 
3 20.5 53.3 12.4 30.8 
4 22.8 64.7 14.6 24.3 
5 19.2 48.7 15.5 42.0 
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Four out of the five ELTs activated upon sensing the crash.  ELT 2 was the beacon that did not 
activate automatically.  Post-test inspections, conducted immediately after the impact, showed that 
the LED remote switch light was not blinking and the distress signal was not being received by 
any of the monitoring methods.  ELT 2 was in the forward tail of the airplane, mounted 
symmetrically with ELT 4, which was the same make and model.   
Antenna cabling connections showed signs of damage for three out of the six total connections. 
ELT 3 contained the only cable from the live ELTs that showed signs that the internal cable had 
partially detached from the end fitting. However, it did not prohibit the transmission of the distress 
signal to the satellites. The two dummy ELT connections showed much worse damage. Dummy 
connection 1 cabling was intact, but the end connection had displayed noticeable pullout from the 
end fitting. Dummy connection 2 cabling sustained even more damage. The end connection was 
still attached to the antenna; however, the cable had pulled out and physically separated. If this 
had been a live ELT connection, the beacon would not have been able to transmit the distress 
signal via the external antenna. The cable/antenna connection failures are shown in Figure 30. 
Figure 30 - Antenna cabling failures for Test 3 
When examining the cabling layout diagram in Figure 27, the three connections that failed are the 
only ones that had crossed a production break between the cabin and tail of the airplane. The 
connections failed due to the large amount of deformation which occurred in the tail after the 
fracture initiated during the crash sequence. The long length of these connections was intentional, 
and specifically made in an attempt to magnify the failure response exhibited in Test 2. All other 
cable runs were made as short as practical, with one exception made for ELT 4. The cable spanned 
the entire tail length, originating from the beacon in the forward tail to the antenna in the rear tail.  
The loads measured from the dummy ELT cables are plotted, and shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31 - Test 2 dummy antenna cable loads 
At first glance, the negative loading in Dummy ELT 2 creates a cause for concern.  The sign 
convention used for these tests indicates a tensile load to be a positive value and a compressive 
load to be a negative value.  A pullout load would indicate a tensile loading condition, while a 
compressive load is somewhat nonsensical due to the lack of capability of the cable in sustaining 
a compressive load.  However, posttest inspections determined that pulling on the cable from an 
angle of greater than 90 degrees applied relative to the load cell orientation caused a compressive 
load to be read in the load cell due to the bending moment.   
This scenario is plausible because the antenna cable was attached into the BNC end which was 
attached to the load cell, which then attached to the dummy ELT weighted block.  This 
configuration created a long moment arm extending from the load cell.  Referring to Figure 8, both 
the load cell and BNC end were pointed forward, as they would be in a typical ELT beacon 
configuration.  The antenna cabling attached to the dummy beacon, and then made a 180 degree 
change in direction turn after which it was subsequently routed under the assembly to an antenna 
in the tail of the airplane and pulled taught.   During the crash when the airplane experienced the 
tail fracture, the subsequent hinging relative motion between the tail and cabin created tension on 
the cable, which pulled down on the dummy ELT 2 fixture.  This downward motion created a 
bending moment at the load cell to dummy mass attachment location, and caused the load cell to 
register a negative reading.  Dummy ELT 1 also experienced signs of cable pullout; however, 
during the timeframe of data collection, the pullout load was not able to be measured. 
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ELT beacons 2 and 4 were disassembled for further investigation. The beacon case, batteries, 
circuit boards, switches and wiring all appeared to be undamaged. The g-switches were extracted 
and a portion of the cylinder was carefully cut away to expose the internal ball and spring 
mechanism, as shown in Figure 32.  The ELTs were identical models, acquired in a single 
procurement from a commercial vendor, mounted in a symmetric configuration in the forward tail, 
with sufficient measured acceleration and delta-v to initiate ELT activation.  
  Figure 32 – G-switch assemblies for ELT beacons 2 and 4 on Test 3 
First examination of the g-switch assemblies showed different materials used for the ball, spring 
and casing.  The ball color varied between ELT beacons 2 and 4 and the spring contained a different 
number of wrapped coils.  The physical weights of the units were within 0.2 gram of each other.  
The g-switches were then measured under a 1-g static load by placing them upright and examining 
the ball position and spring compression under gravity load only, as shown in Figure 33.   
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Figure 33 - G-switch assemblies for ELT beacons 2 and 4 on Test 3 under 1-g loading 
It is clear from examining the ball position in Figure 33 that there are differences in the g-switch 
response under 1-g loading.  The spring from ELT beacon 2 compressed 0.2386 in. while the 
spring from ELT beacon 4 compressed 0.3955 in.  The spring on ELT beacon 4 compressed enough 
to allow the ball to make contact with the post in the middle.  It is unknown whether the ELT 4 g-
switch had arrived at LaRC in this condition or whether the crash caused the spring stiffness to 
change.  The spring stiffness was unknown prior to g-switch disassembly.  However, as with all 
units, once the ELTs had arrived at LaRC, they were put through functional checks to ensure proper 
operation.  All ELTs, including Test 3 ELT 4, passed functional checkouts before being used in 
testing, and ELT 4 performed normally and activated upon sensing the impact from Test 3. 
 
ELT beacon 5 was the only ELT from all three tests which did not use a mechanical g-switch 
sensor, but instead contained a solid-state sensor.  This type of beacon required a constant 
connection to aircraft power both to operate the crash sensor under normal conditions and also to 
keep the internal ELT batteries charged in the case of the loss of aircraft power.  The internal 
batteries allow the ELT the ability to operate under its own internal power should the aircraft power 
connection be lost for the minimum duration required by current ELT performance specifications.  
A ruggedized 28-volt battery was installed in the original airplane battery box to power the unit.  
ELT 5 performed nominally during the crash, both sensing the crash event, and sending a signal 
to the SARSAT system.   
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Discussion  
All mounting systems performed as designed in each test.  In all cases, the ELT beacon remained 
in its mounting tray, secured and not posing a threat to other onboard equipment.  All restraints 
remained closed and all cabling remained attached.   For aircraft attachment, the beacon attachment 
plates interfaced with primary aircraft structure.  NASA followed all applicable requirements and 
incorporated guidance from aircraft technicians in order to replicate traditional in-service methods.   
G-switch activation performance was inconsistent across the test series.  Out of the 14 ELTs, 12 
beacons activated automatically.  However, evidence suggests that 3 out of the 4 ELTs in Test 1 
may have activated due to post-crash vehicle arrest by the catch net.  All non-activated ELTs were 
disassembled for post-test inspections in an attempt to identify a possible root-cause for non-
activation.  In the case of the non-activated ELT on Test 2, the internal ELT beacon structure, 
along with internal components of the g-switch assembly appeared to be fully intact, with no 
apparent signs of damage or wear.  In the case of the non-activated ELT on Test 3, the unit was 
disassembled and compared to an identical, functional ELT mounted in a similar location in the 
airplane.  Upon inspection and comparison of the g-switches, noticeable differences were 
observed, suggesting that a difference in performance would be expected.     
ELT 5 in Test 3 was the only ELT beacon which used an active solid-state crash sensor.  This 
sensor was non-mechanical in nature and required that it be connected to aircraft power for normal 
operations.  This ELT performed nominally. 
Critical data were obtained from examining the different types of antenna cable run conditions.  
Cables which intentionally did not use best practice guidelines were much more susceptable to 
damage, especially under large aircraft deformation.  Four cases of cable pullouts were observed, 
and all occurred on long cable runs.  Some type of cabling damage occurred on almost all instances 
where a long run was present, and where the antenna cable spanned the cabin/tail junction.  It was 
also noted that the damage to the cabling was insensitive to cable brand or type.  In general, 
crashworthiness of cabling system was improved when the antenna was installed in the same 
longitudinal station of the airframe as the beacon and when best practice guidelines were followed 
for including cable slack and usage of tethers.        
Conclusions 
Three airplane crash tests containing either four or five Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) 
systems were documented in this report.  The tests, considered severe but survivable in terms of 
occupant survival, offered significantly different impact environments in which various makes and 
models of ELTs were required to operate, and provided valuable data to examine ELT 
performance.   The first test simulated a hard or emergency landing onto a rigid surface with 
subsequent impact into a compliant barrier or obstruction.  The second and third tests simulated 
controlled flight into terrain conditions, either nose up or nose down.  In each of these tests, the 
ELTs were installed in a variety of locations and orientations representative of typical in-service 
configurations.  All ELT activations and transmissions were monitored using a variety of methods, 
and failure of ELT cabling was examined using cable tension readings, and visual inspections.  
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Examination of the results showed inconsistent crash sensor performance and a variety of antenna 
cable failures that occurred when best practice installation guidance was not followed.    
It is anticipated that the data generated in this study will assist in identifying methods for improving 
the installation and performance of ELT systems.  Future recommendations to the RTCA will 
incorporate lessons learned from this test series with the goal of assisting the design and installation 
of higher performing ELT systems. In the past, TSOs have successfully initiated changes in ELT 
designs.  It is conceivable that future guidance can be issued to update installation requirements 
based on the results presented.  
Hopefully, a pilot never encounters a situation where their ELT must be used.  If this unfortunate 
circumstance does occur, the functionality of the ELT system must be reliable, and the data 
collected from this study will assist in achieving this goal. 
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